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CASE NOTES
ANTITRUST-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-CONSIGNMENT
CONTRACT BETWEEN OIL COMPANY AND FILLING
STATION OPERATOR: IS IT ILLEGAL AS AGREE-
MENT FOR RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE?
Union Oil Company subleased a service station in Fresno, California,
to Richard S. Simpson for a period of one year subject to termination by
the lessee with 30 days' notice. Concurrently with the signing of the lease,
Simpson and Union Oil executed a written Retail Dealer Consignment
Agreement, terminable by either party at the end of any year and ceasing
on any termination of lessee's right to occupy the service station. Under
the terms of the consignment agreement, Union Oil retained legal title to
the gasoline until it was sold by consignee at prices established by con-
signor: Simpson did not pay for gasoline as delivered but accounted for
the proceeds of any gasoline sales; Union Oil paid all property taxes on
the consigned gasoline; Simpson was required to account for all products
lost through his negligence and to carry personal liability and property
damage insurance; and Simpson received a commission which changed
with any fluctuation in retail price but which was never less than a fixed
minimum. The lease and consignment agreements were executed on May
23, 1956, and in 1957 Union Oil gave Simpson a new one-year lease ending,
by its express terms, on May 22, 1958. In March of 1958, a price war de-
veloped in the Fresno area, and gasoline p iices dropped from 34.9 to 27.9
cents per gallon. Despite the company's demand that he adhere to an
authorized price of 29.9 cents, Simpson sold at 27.9. In April, 1958, Union
notified Simpson that when his current lea se expired on May 22 it would
not be renewed. On May 21, 1958, Simpson brought action under sections
4 and 16 of the Clayton Act' and obtained a temporary restraining order
preventing Union Oil from taking possession of the station. But on June
3, 1958, the court denied an interlocutory injunction, holding that the
lease and consignment agreement had expired, Simpson v. Union Oil Co.2
Union then obtained judgment for unlawful detainer in a state court and
'Clayton Act, 15 U.S. Code §§ 15, 26 (1958).
"Section 4. That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained. ... "
"Section 16. That any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief
in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws ..
2 162 F. Supp. 746 (1962).
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regained possession of the station. Simpson next amended his complaint
to obtain damages in lieu of equitable relief, alleging violation of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 3 and obtained summary judgment after pro-
longed pre-trial conferences. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and plain-
tiff brought certiorari. 4 The Supreme Court, with three justices dissenting,
reversed on the question of liability and remanded for hearing on other
issues including extent of damages. In holding for plaintiff the court said,
in part, "resale price maintenance through the present, coercive type of
'consignment' agreement is illegal under the antitrust laws." Simpson v.
Union Oil Company, 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
Agreements for resale price maintenance have long been held illegal, as
have unilateral refusals to deal by a supplier to force a retailer to follow
the suppliers "recommended" retail prices.5 Consignment marketing
through an agent has been a recognized method permitting a supplier to
control market prices. The Union Oil case is an extension of previous law,
since it holds that a consignment agreement, enforced by a unilateral re-
fusal to deal, constitutes an agreement for resale price maintenance. The
purpose of this note is to show how the Union Oil case fits into the
spectrum of the law of resale price maintenance.
Today, agreements for the purpose of resale price maintenance are un-
questionably illegal. One who sells goods cannot control the price at
which the purchaser resells it. As early as 1911, contracts seeking to con-
trol resale prices were held to violate the Sherman Act in Dr. Miles Co. v.
John D. Park & Son.6 Cases such as United States v. Colgate & Co.7 and
Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Packing Co.8 made it clear that
even in the absence of a formal contract the supplier does not have com-
plete freedom to exert pressure on the retailer to coerce adherence to rec-
ommended pricing policies. With the case of United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co.,9 in 1960, the concept of an agreement for resale price maintenance
completed its evolution from the formal contract required in the Dr. Miles
3 Sherman Act, 15 U.S. Code §§ 1, 2 (1958).
"Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal ......
"Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor. ...
4 311 F.2d 764 (1963).
5 For a thorough discussion of resale price maintenance, see Levi, The Parke-Davis-
Colgate Doctrine: The Ban of Resale Price Maintenance, in THE SUPREME COURT RE-
viEw 258 (1960 Edition).
6 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 8 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
7250 U.S. 300 (1919). 9 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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case to an implied contract to be inferred from the conduct of the
parties.10
Although the Colgate case expressly provided that a simple refusal to
deal was not illegal, the Parke-Davis case so limited the doctrine as to
make it questionable if a supplier may enforce retail price policies by
refusing to do business with violators. 1 '[f a threatened refusal to deal is
successful, a strong argument can be made that an "agreement" for resale
price maintenance has been formed. 12 If the threat goes unheeded and
the refusal becomes a reality, then a suit by the retailer against the supplier
will probably be upheld.13 In the absence of a fair trade law,1 4 vertical
agreements respecting resale prices are illegal. Of course, any horizontal
agreement to fix prices is also illegal.
Resale price maintenance would seem to demand a sale by the supplier
and a resale by the purchaser. Thus consignments, whereby an agent sells
goods of his principal at prices fixed by him, with title passing directly
from producer to consumer have been held not to constitute resale price
maintenance, in the case of United States v. General Electric." In this
case, after carefully examining General Electric's consignment agree-
10 The Court also emphasized that Parke-Davis used the willingness of one major
retailer to maintain prices as a lever to induce the acquiescence of the other retailers.
In effect then, Parke-Davis acted as an information clearing house to coordinate agree-
ments (albeit sometimes unwilling agreement) between its various wholesale and
retail outlets to maintain the same schedule of retail prices. Parke-Davis was to estab-
lish the prices to be charged and was to police the agreements by cutting off supply
to any violator. With these facts, a Sherman Act violation could probably be found
on the conspiracy theory.
11 Even before the Parke-Davis decision, the Report of the Attorney General's Na-
tional Committee to Study the Anti-trust Laws roted at pages 132-37: "Viewed in the
larger business setting, even individually conceived refusals to deal may become an
integral element in a violation of § 1 if the S1erman Act. Thus, enforcement of a
resale price policy against resourceful price-cutting dealers may invite joint policing
efforts, tantamount to agreement, between the seller and distributors willing to adhere
to his resale price. . . . In the absence of an operative Fair Trade exemption, every
plan to control resale prices by withholding goods from price-cutters may flounder
as an unfair method of competition if involving an understanding beyond a naked
refusal to deal."
12 See Comment, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 766 (1963:,.
13 See Klein v. American Luggage Works, 206 F. Supp. 924 (1962). This is a case
where not only the supplier but all retailers wh a adhered to the supplier's suggested
prices were held liable in a treble damages suit brought by a retailer who was cut
off by the supplier for failure to follow dictated prices.
14 The McGuire Act provides that agreements for resale price maintenance are not
a violation of federal antitrust laws if permitted by a state fair trade law, provided said
agreements are between supplier and retailers. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958) for the text
of the McGuire Act. Horizontal agreements (between competitors) as distinguished
from vertical agreements are still a violation of tle Sherman Act.
15 272 U.S. 476 (1926). The General Electric Company had established a nation-
wide system to distribute electric light bulbs through "agents." The agents could sell
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ments,16 the Court found nothing inconsistent with the agency relationship
claimed by the company. The Court concluded,
... there is nothing as a matter of principle or in the authorities which requires
us to hold that genuine contracts of agency like those before us, however com-
prehensive as a mass or whole in their effect, are violation of the Anti-trust Act.
The owner of an article patented or otherwise is not violating the common law
or the Anti-trust Law by seeking to dispose of his articles directly to the con-
sumer and fixing the price by which his agents transfer the title from him
directly to such customer. 17
Although consignment contracts permit the supplier to fix retail prices,
the courts have carefully scrutinized such agreements to be sure that the
relationship is one of agency in substance as well as form. Thus, in Stand-
ard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.,' s an agreement which purported
to be one for an agency was found to be one of sale since it contained
provisions that the "agent" would "purchase" a minimum quantity of pat-
terns. Where several competitors having conflicting patents agreed to
honor Masonite's patents in return for an "agency" to sell at prices to be
established by Masonite as principal, a violation of the Sherman Act was
established by the case of United States v. Masonite.19
The petroleum industry, in an effort to stabilize market prices, has been
quick to avail itself of the price-fixing umbrella afforded by consignment
marketing. Like the courts, the Federal Trade Commission has looked with
disfavor on such arrangements and whenever possible has found them
only at prices set by General Electric. Indeed, the evidence indicated that the purpose
of the consignment program was to circumvent the antitrust prohibition against manu-
facturer's control of resale prices.
16 To determine if General Electric's contracts with its purported agents were true
agency agreements or just a ruse for resale price maintenance, the Court took par-
ticular cognizance of the method of payment for the goods; risk of loss; right to return
unsold goods; language of the agreement; and the duty to carry insurance. The Court
found nothing to make the so-called "agents" anything more than genuine agents of
the company or the delivery of the stock to each agent anything more than a consign-
ment to the agent for his custody and sale as such.
17 272 U.S. at 488.
18258 U.S. 346 (1922). In this same case, 259 Fed. 793, 794-95 (1919), the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit said, "We may test the question whether the defendant
was the plaintiff's agent engaged in selling the plaintiff's goods or a vendor selling its
own goods, by querying whether the plaintiff could be held liable in tort for the
defendant's material and false misrepresentations made to a customer .... Obviously,
if the defendant was the plaintiff's agents, its misrepresentations would bind the plain-
tiff." Although this comment misses the distinction between master-servant and prin-
cipal-agent, it is of passing interest since in Gonzalez v. Derrington, 10 Cal. Reptr. 700
(Cal. App. 1961), a tort case involving the negligence of a service station employee
at one of Union Oil's stations which was under the consignment program indentical
with the Simpson agreement, the Court said at page 712, "Union argues that under said
consignment agreement, it may not be held liable for ... Derrington because the latter
was: (1) an independant contractor. ..
19316 U.S. 265 (1942).
CASE NOTES
illegal. Being bound by judicial precedent to the General Electric doctrine,
the FTC has nevertheless invalidated service station consignment agree-
ments because they were entered into as a ruse to promote a horizontal
conspiracy between dealers, 20 or because they were not a good faith mar-
keting program established in the regular course of business. 21 In both
instances, the General Electric doctrine was discussed and distinguished.
Thus, it has been the policy of the courts to view with suspicion con-
signment agreements fixing retail prices and to enforce the warning voiced
in Masonite that "so far as the Sherman Act is concerned the result must
turn not on the skill with which counsel has manipulated the concepts
of sale and agency but on the significance of the business practices in
terms of restraint of trade. '22
Union Oil met the FTC criteria by negotiating unilateral consignment
agreements with each of its retail station operators individually, as part of
its regular course of doing business. The agreements were modeled after
the one approved in the General Electric case, and it was neither alleged
nor concluded that Union Oil's consignment agreements were a sham,
the court making no express finding as to whether or not Simpson was
in reality an agent of Union Oil. Whereas, General Electric's system was
upheld, Union Oil's consignment program was deemed illegal,23 but the
exact basis for the finding was left unclear. To be sure, Union's purpose
was to control the retail price of gasoline, but heretofore it was believed
that this could be accomplished by a bona fide agency.24
In an opinion characterized by Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent as being
20 The FTC found Sun Oil to be guilty of resale price maintenance when Sun
sponsored joint meetings between its service station dealers to encourage all of them
to enter a consignment agreement under which Sun would set uniform retail prices
to be charged by its "agents." "Sun unlike United States v. General Electric Co., 272
U.S. 476 (1921) did not content itself with unilateral vertical arrangements but in-
stead joined with its dealers in horizontal arrangements." Sun Oil Company. F.T.C.
DKT. 6934 (1963), in C. C. H. Trade Reg. Rep. 16418.
21 Atlantic Refining negotiated unilateral vertical agreements of consignment with
its dealers (individually as opposed to Sun's joint meetings) which were illegal be-
cause, "Unlike General Electric, the agency distribution program was not respondent's
regular method of selling its products .... The temporary nature of the program and
the shifting back and forth of customers from dealer status to so-called "agency" status
emphasizes that the consignment plan is a device :o fix and stabilize prices, rather than
a good faith marketing method." Atlantic Refining Co., F.T.C. DKT. 7471 (1963), in
C. C. H. Trade Reg. Rep. 16422.
22 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942).
23 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
24 In the General Electric case, the Court noted: "The plan was of course devised for
the purpose of enabling the company to deal directly with consumers and purchasers
and doubtless was intended to avoid selling the lamps owned by the company to jobbers
or dealers and prevent sale by these middle men to consumers at different and com-
peting prices." 272 U.S. 476, 483 (1926).
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"unwarranted, unnecessary, and premature," 25 the Supreme Court held
Union Oil liable in civil action for having violated the Sherman Act. The
Court concluded, "there was an agreement for resale price maintenance,
coercively employed"26 and that "we hold only that resale price mainte-
nance through the present, coercive type of 'consignment' is illegal under
the antitrust laws."'27 The Court distinguished the General Electric hold-
ing on the rather slim ground that General Electric was seeking to control
the retail price of patented articles on which price fixing was condoned,
and "whatever may be said of the General Electric case on its special
facts, involving patents, it is not apposite to the special facts here." This
sharply limits the scope of the General Electric doctrine since, as observed
by Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissent, "so far as the record now before us
discloses, the two agreements are virtually indistinguishable. ' 2 As noted
above, the Court, in the General Electric decision, stated that the consign-
ment marketer could control prices of articles "patented or otherwise."
The Union Oil decision seems to be motivated by a desire of the Court
to strike down any marketing practice that permits the supplier to control
retail prices.29 At least two theories could have been employed by the
Court to reach this decision: refusal to renew a one-year lease constitutes
coercion within the prohibition of the Parke-Davis case; and a series of
vertical agreements forms a conspiracy to fix retail prices.
Unfortunately, the Court did little to explain its decision, but repeatedly
referred to Union's marketing program as a "coercive consignment de-
vice," and as such found it to be illegal. Presumably, the coercion referred
to is Union Oil's threat to not renew the leases of service station oper-
ators who violate the consignment pricing terms. It is at least questionable
that a supplier can ever coerce a retailer into following a prescribed
course of conduct by threatening to discontinue dealing. One interpre-
tation of the Union Oil decision is that it represents a simple extension
of the Dr. Miles and Parke-Davis cases prohibiting use of a refusal to deal
to enforce pricing practices. This interpretation is strengthened by the
Court's repeated emphasis on the vulnerable position of the lessee-con-
signee e.g., "We made it clear in United States v. Parke-Davis Co. [cita-
tions omitted] that a supplier may not use coercion on its retail outlets
25 Simpson v. Union Oil, 377 U.S. 13, 26 (1964).
26 Id. at 24. 27 Ibid. 28 Id. at 26.
29 Thus the Court speculated, at page 17, that the present consignment agreement
"promises to be equally if not more effective in maintaining gasoline prices than were
the Parke-Davis techniques in fixing monopoly prices on drugs." Again, at pages 21-22,
it noted: "When however, a 'consignment' device is used to cover a vast gasoline
distribution system fixing prices through many retail outlets, the antitrust laws prevent
calling the consignment an agency .... The present coercive 'consignment' device, if
successful against challenge under the antitrust laws, furnished a wooden formula for
administering prices on a vast scale."
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to achieve resale price maintenance. We reiterate that view, adding that
it matters not what the coercive device is."30 Mr. Justice Goldberg's dis-
sent in the Union Oil case3' tacitly assumes that a coercive type of con-
signment agreement is illegal, but doesn't decide if this agreement is
coercive.
The General Electric doctrine (i.e. bona fide consignments are legal)
was established in an action brought by th.- Justice Department, with no
allegation that coercive pressure was being exerted on dealers- to enforce
the agreements. The use by Union Oil of one-year service station leases
to enforce its consignment agreements is a significant modification of the
conduct approved by the General Electric decision and could be the logi-
cal basis for the Court's decision, rather than a blanket holding that con-
signments constitute resale price maintenance. Thus, consignment mar-
keting may be legal in the absence of leases or, possibly, when the lease
is of more than one-year duration.32
Perhaps Union's conduct could be found illegal on yet another basis.
The consignment marketing program was established by Union Oil to
permit it to designate retail gasoline prices Certainly each of the dealers
who signed consignment agreements understood that the same type of
agreement would be required of all other dealers and that Union Oil
would designate the same retail price at all stations at least in a given area.
There is some basis for concluding, as was done in the Sun Oil case, that
the consignment program constituted a conspiracy to maintain prices.
In the Masonite case the Court noted:
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed with-
out simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators .... Ac-
ceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to
participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is
restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful con-
spiracy under the Sherman Act.3 3
Under either the coercion or conspiracy :-ationales, Union Oil's conduct
may be found to be a violation of the antitrust acts. Since the General
3Old. at 17. 311d. at 31.
32 In United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 1959 Trade Cases 69399, a
consent decree was entered against the seven largest west coast oil companies charged
with violation of Antitrust Acts. Union Oil was one of the seven defendants and as
part of the decree it was agreed that henceforth service station lease agreements would
be for at least three years if the lessee so desired. The Justice Department did not
object to a consignment program per se, but short-term leases, such as one-year lease
in the Simpson case, were prohibited. This decree was handed down over a year after
Simpson ceased to be a dealer of Union Oil; and, therefore, that agreement did not
violate the consent decree. However, this does point out that using the short-term
lease as a club to enforce the consignment constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act,
not the consignment itself.
33 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942).
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Electric case did not involve coercion, 4 the Union Oil decision does not
necessarily indicate a complete change of judicial thinking on consign-
ment marketing. Further clarification of this area awaits future litigation,
at which time it is hoped the Court will clearly enunciate a theory on
resale price maintenance.8 5
George Spindler
84 In United States v. General Electric, 82 F. Supp. 753 (1949), the Justice Depart-
ment again challenged General Electric's distribution system of agents and consign-
ment contracts but the Court again found the relationship of the parties to be con-
sistent with true agencies. Of course, Union exerted far more pressure on its dealers
than General Electric, since by cancelling service station leases Union could put
them out of business. All General Electric could do was to quit supplying light bulbs,
but since most of its agents were general merchants, this would injure only one line
of products marketed by them, not their entire business.
85 It is believed that the present case will eventually be disposed of by the applica-
tion of the McGuire Act and the California Fair Trade Law in favor of Union Oil.
The CAL. Bus. & P. CODE § 16902 (1964) provides that contracts for resale price mainte-
nance are not illegal as long as the parties do not compete. Since Union Oil did not
operate any retail outlets in the Fresno, California area, it should not be prevented from
forming a valid fair-trade agreement with Simpson. Such an agreement, being legal
in California, would not violate the Sherman Act because of the provision of the
McGuire Act. Thus, if Union's "consignments" were really resale price agreements,
as the Court thought, they would be legal. It is perplexing why the Court did not itself
apply the Fair Trade statutes instead of ignoring them and finding the marketing
practices of Union to be illegal, but apparently the Court was anxious to go on record
as being opposed to retail prices which are established through consignment agree-
ments enforced by the threat of possible loss of business franchise. The Court in re-
manding, provided that the Fair Trade Acts should be considered.
COMMERCIAL LAW-SUBROGATION AND PRIORITY
OF LIENS ON CHATTELS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE
French Lumber Company, the purchaser, brought a bill in equity to
determine the ownership of certain funds derived from the sale of a 1959
Cadillac automobile at public auction. The purchaser had financed its
purchase of the vehicle through Ware Trust Company (the first lienor)
in February of 1959, and entered into a Uniform Commercial Code se-
curity agreement as security for its note. This agreement was duly re-
corded. Five months later, the purchaser pledged its existing equity in the
automobile, along with certain other security, to Commercial Realty &
Finance Company (the second lienor). With knowledge that its rights
were subordinated to those of the first lienor, Commercial duly filed its
lien on the automobile. The automobile was subsequently repossessed by
the first lienor when the purchaser defaulted in its payments on the note.
The purchaser thereupon arranged with Associates Discount Corporation
